MOONSHINE — A story of psychological warfare

This is an overview of the story of Radio Atlantico de Sur. It contains links to other posts on this blog that focus in much more detail on specific aspects of the story.

RAdS said it was an "additional station" to the one run by Argentina from Stanley
Front and back of a British leaflet aimed at Argentine troops
Image credit: PsyWar.Org

Radio Atlantico del Sur  –  Profile of a psychological operation

Summary: A Spanish-language shortwave radio station operated by the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the final four weeks of the April-June 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) War to support the operations of British forces.

Target audience: Argentine military personnel in the Falkland Islands.

Objectives: To persuade Argentine troops to "hesitate before firing on British troops" and to "consider positively the benefits of surrendering". 

These objectives were set out in a now-declassified MoD document known as the “Interim Assessment” first drafted on or shortly before 10 May 1982 (more than a week before Radio Atlantico del Sur went on the air). The Interim Assessment was written by RAdS’s civilian manager, Neil ffrench-Blake, who says in his memoirs that it originally included a third objective: "to discourage enemy troops from mistreating the civilian population".

Psychological techniques: Broadcasts aimed at demoralising the target audience by reinforcing feelings of homesickness and isolation, and unsettling the listener through an implicit but regular reminder of his predicament – he was a long way from home, facing a determined, well-equipped and well-trained enemy, and without hope of reinforcement or relief. (By the time RAdS was launched the islands were under a British air and sea blockade.)

A directive to the station's staff instructed it to increase the audience's sense of isolation "by direct reference to events taking place on the islands known only to the garrison, coupled with information about their own town on the mainland".

Specific themes used in broadcasts included: stressing the lack of training of Argentinian conscripts by comparison with British troops; playing on fears of British specialist units such as the SAS and SBS; and noting the lack of medical facilities available to Argentine forces.

Codename: In the planning stage, the radio station was known as Project MOONSHINE. Once it was on the air the codename was PINOCHIO (sic), though MOONSHINE is the name that is best remembered. See the post “No lies are to be told”.  

Logistics of operation: Programmes were produced in London and beamed to the islands by a BBC shortwave transmitter on Ascension Island. 

All broadcasts went out live from a studio of the Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC) in Kings Buildings, Dean Stanley Street, Westminster, normally used by the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS). See the posts The Secret is Revealed: Radio Atlantico del Sur's studio and Pinpointing the location: “on the left at the top of the stairs”.  

The programme was initially fed from the UK to the transmitter on Ascension Island via BT’s Rugby Radio Station. See the post The Incident at Crowsley Park on the Night of 20-21 May 1982.  

Later, a better quality feed to the transmitter was provided by a telephone link using the undersea cable from Europe to Ascension.

Transmission arrangements: The signal was aired from a 250-kilowatt transmitter at the BBC Atlantic Relay Station on Ascension Island. The frequencies were 9710 kilohertz for the evening broadcast and 9700 kHz for the morning one, both in the 31-metre shortwave band. Both frequencies were close to 9690 kHz, which was used during the war by various stations in Argentina. [1] 

For details of the Ascension transmitter, see the post The Requisitioning of Sender 302. 

Hours of transmission: Throughout its short life, RAdS transmitted a three-hour evening broadcast each day at 8 p.m. Falklands time (equivalent to 2300 GMT or midnight London time).

From 28 May, an additional one-hour early morning broadcast was aired each day at 5.30 a.m. Falklands’ time (0830 GMT or 0930 London time). [2]

Total number of broadcasts: 47. These were made up of 28 evening broadcasts (19 May to 15 June) and 19 morning broadcasts (28 May to 15 June).

Staffing: Programmes were produced by a group of more than 30 civilian and military personnel using the cover name of the Media Assessment Team (MAT). The MAT included a civilian station manager (Neil ffrench-Blake), nine presenters (all but one being members of the British armed forces), five translators/writers, three Spanish-speaking typists, two civilian journalists, a civilian radio engineer, two RAF technicians, three junior NCOs from the British Army's Intelligence Corps and five administrative staff. 

Command and control: The MAT was under the overall control of Lieutenant-Colonel B and Squadron-Leader G, both posted from the Psychological Operations Section, Joint Warfare Wing of the National Defence College at Latimer, Buckinghamshire. They in turn reported to Colonel S, head of the MoD’s Special Projects Group (SPG), which had been formed just over a week after the Argentine invasion. [3]

Presenters: All the on-air staff used pseudonyms. This included the sole female announcer. See the post Mariana Flores, Britain’s psychological weapon against the Argentine forces.  

Postal address: Listeners were invited to write to Post Office Box 408, London. Letters addressed to the station c/o the MoD were also answered.

Cost: After the war, the total cost of the project was said to have been about £40,000 (equivalent to around £140,000 in 2018 prices). Before broadcasts started, costs had been estimated at up to £20,000 per week.

Argentine counter-measures: These included:

• RAdS's signal was jammed (though this might have been ineffective in the target area)
• The Argentine military chaplain in the Falklands warned troops that listening to RAdS was a mortal sin (thus possibly increasingly its allure by giving it forbidden-fruit status)
• Radio sets were confiscated from Falkland Islanders, reportedly to prevent them from being used by Argentine conscripts to listen to RAdS
• A privately-owned Buenos Aires-based news agency, Noticias Argentinas, was closed by the authorities for 72 hours in early June. The MoD said this was because the news agency had cited the list of Argentine POWs that was broadcast nightly by RAdS, though other reasons for the closure have been suggested – see the post General Galtieri’s mystery decree 

In later life, Neil ffrench-Blake (1940-2016) used this photo on his Twitter account
Appropriately, his face - like much of his clandestine professional life - is partly obscured

Timeline of Project MOONSHINE

Events in April-June 1982:

Before MOONSHINE

Morning of 2 April: Argentine forces invade the Falklands (Operation ROSARIO). They take control of the local radio station, the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service (FIBS), rename it LRA60 Radio Nacional Islas Malvinas and introduce Spanish news bulletins alongside the English ones. 

5 April: British Task Force sails from Portsmouth for the South Atlantic.

6 April: A War Cabinet is formed in Britain, known formally as OD(SA) – Overseas and Defence Committee (South Atlantic). 

Also on 6 April, the BBC begins broadcasting its formerly Sundays-only Calling the Falklands programme three times a week. See the post "London Calling the Falkland Islands" – the BBC's lifeline service. 

7 April: The BBC’s nightly four-hour service in Spanish to Latin America is extended to five hours (2015-0115 Argentine time).

11 April: A Special Projects Group (SPG) is formed at the MoD to support Operation CORPORATE (the codename for the British operation to recover the Falklands).

The SPG is headed by a Colonel S and is tasked by the Chiefs of Staff with the “collection, collation and development of ideas for deception, psychological operations and the development of plans from those ideas”. 

The SPG’s initial work includes devising proposals to spread a rumour in the insurance markets about British intentions to mine Argentine waters and to plant misleading information in the press about British anti-submarine torpedoes. 

21 April (or perhaps a day or two earlier): Argentina launches its English-language radio station Liberty, targeting members of the British Task Force and an audience in the UK. See the post Argentine Annie and Radio Atlantico del Sur – A Comparative Study. 

(The timing is interesting, but there is no evidence that RAdS was proposed as a response to Liberty.)

22 April: By this date the SPG still does not appear to be spending much time thinking about broadcasting. In a four-page memo written that day, summarising the SPG’s current activity, Colonel S only mentions possible radio operations in a single sentence: “Although broadcasting to the islands will be feasible once we have surface ships within 200 miles, to do so will advertise the exact position of the ships involved.” Colonel S’s memo makes no mention of the idea of transmitting from Ascension Island rather than from ships at sea.

Also on 22 April, Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri pays a brief visit to the islands.

26 April: The BBC increases its Calling the Falklands programme to daily broadcasts.

The same day, the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS) launches a morale-boosting programme for UK forces in the South Atlantic. See the post “BFBS Calling the United Kingdom Task Force”.

MOONSHINE is proposed, opposed and approved

28 April: The past week has seen the SPG devoting much more attention to radio plans. On this date it submits a case (known as SPG 020) to set up Radio Atlantico del Sur, under the codeword MOONSHINE, using a transmitter on Ascension.

SPG 020 provokes immediate opposition from the Foreign Office (FCO).

End of April and start of May: The war takes on a new tempo with Britain enforcing a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the islands (30 April), the RAF bombing of Stanley airport (1 May), the sinking of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano (2 May) and the Exocet strike on HMS Sheffield (4 May). 

After the bombing of the airport, the occupying forces end the shortwave and mediumwave (AM) transmissions of Radio Nacional Islas Malvinas and restrict its dissemination to a cable service, meaning that Argentine forces must turn to stations outside the islands to hear over-the-air broadcasts. (See entry for 11 June.)

First week of May: Argentina begins jamming BBC broadcasts in Spanish to Latin America and the BBC’s daily Calling the Falklands programme. In response, the BBC adds additional shortwave frequencies to the transmission of the Spanish service’s evening broadcast and (on 7 May) starts a daily broadcast in the morning (0800-0830 Argentine time).

3 May: The MoD revises its 28 April proposal on Radio Atlantico del Sur in a bid to meet FCO objections. For the text of the revised proposal, known as SPG Paper No 6, see the post "The codeword for this operation is MOONSHINE".

Despite the revisions, the FCO maintains its opposition to the project. Wangling between the MoD and the FCO over the plans for RAdS continues during the first two weeks of May.

Nevertheless, the SPG begins planning RAdS’s programmes and starts recruiting personnel to operate the station, disguising the recruitment under a cover name, the Media Assessment Team (MAT). One of the civilian members of the MAT has described how he was recruited.

As a result, Radio Atlantico del Sur is ready to go on the air from around 10 May.

10 May: The prime minister’s press secretary, Bernard Ingham, writes a letter – circulated around Whitehall and described by one MoD official as "emotive" and "ill-informed" – denouncing Project MOONSHINE.

With the arguments in Whitehall unresolved, it is clear that the dispute over MOONSHINE will only be ended by taking the matter to the War Cabinet for a final decision. The arguments are described in the post “The War Cabinet is invited to agree”.

13 May: A proposal to launch MOONSHINE is submitted to the War Cabinet. The text of the proposal is contained in the post The Foreign Office's last stand. 

Morning of 18 May: The War Cabinet approves Project MOONSHINE.

MOONSHINE on the air 

Morning of 19 May: MoD issues press statement on the launch of Radio Atlantico del Sur, and announces that, using its powers under Article 19 of the BBC's Licence and Agreement, the government is requisitioning the use of one of the four shortwave transmitters at the BBC's Ascension Island relay station. 

Evening of 19 May: Radio Atlantico del Sur makes its first broadcast at 2000 Falklands time, starting with its two signature tunes.

The lead story in its news bulletins that evening is that efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Falklands conflict are on the verge of breaking down and that opinion in the UK is that an all-out British attack on the islands is imminent. 

The station also gives prominence to the SAS raid on Pebble Island on 15 May. 

Morning of 20 May: The coverage of the SAS raid in the previous night’s broadcast causes concern within the MoD. See the post Did the MoD broadcast military secrets to Argentina?

Evening of 20 May: Radio Atlantico del Sur’s military commentator, who uses the on-air name Jaime Montero, looks at the effectiveness of Britain’s Harrier aircraft, quoting from Latin American press sources.

21 May: Ground campaign begins with landing of British forces at San Carlos (Operation SUTTON).

26 May: In a bid to counteract Argentine jamming, the BBC increases from two to four the number of frequencies carrying its daily Calling the Falklands programme.

28 May: Radio Atlantico del Sur starts an additional daily broadcast, in the early morning.

28-29 May: Battle of Goose Green (see entry for 2 June).

1 June: 5th Infantry Brigade begins disembarking at San Carlos. The Brigade had made part of its journey to the Falklands on the QE2. 

That evening, Radio Atlantico del Sur broadcasts news of the use of the QE2 to transport reinforcements, in contravention of MoD policy. (The MoD imposed a blackout on reporting the movement of 5th Infantry Brigade until 6 June.)

2 June: The Noticias Argentinas news agency publishes the names of some of the Argentine troops captured at Goose Green, as broadcast by Radio Atlantico del Sur the previous evening.

5-7 June: Noticias Argentinas is ordered by the authorities to close for 72 hours. See the post General Galtieri’s mystery decree.

11 June: Radio Nacional Islas Malvinas returns to the air briefly to broadcast the Mass delivered by Pope John Paul II during his visit to Argentina.

The battle for Stanley begins.

That evening, and on following days, Radio Atlantico del Sur broadcasts features stressing the behaviour that Argentine forces must observe under the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of civilians. 

14 June: Radio Atlantico del Sur begins its evening broadcast by reporting that white flags are flying in Stanley.

Later that evening, General Mario Menendez surrenders all his forces in the islands. 

15 June: The two final broadcasts of Radio Atlantico del Sur.

Also on 15 June, Argentina ends its jamming of the BBC.

16 June: The requisitioned Ascension Island transmitter returns to full BBC use.

RAdS used offices on the first floor of Kings Buildings, Westminster
It broadcast from a BFBS studio in the basement
Photo © Chris Greenway

Aftermath

The story of Radio Atlantico del Sur largely fell into obscurity after the war. (In the English-speaking world, that is. There’s a separate story to be told about what’s been said on the subject by Spanish speakers.)

The station closed the day after the surrender and the broadcasting team dispersed, its members sworn to secrecy to protect the identity of those colleagues with family connections with Argentina.

A few articles about Radio Atlantico del Sur appeared shortly after the war in specialist radio publications, based on press reporting during the conflict (much of which was critical of RAdS and none of which was detailed) along with observations from enthusiasts who had heard the broadcasts. But there was very little interest among a wider public. Two popular British books about the war, published shortly after the conflict, made no mention of the station. [4] 

Neil ffrench-Blake’s identity as RAdS’s civilian manager was “blown” in the late 1980s, though without attracting any attention beyond that of specialist radio historians and enthusiasts. ffrench-Blake himself kept a public silence about his role for more than three decades. All the other members of RAdS’s staff have retained their anonymity to this day.

In 2005, some of the policy discussions about RAdS within government during the war were described in The Official History of the Falklands Campaign (Volume 2) by Sir Lawrence Freedman. But Freedman does not appear to have spoken to any of the station’s staff, relying entirely on official documents to tell its story, and saying almost nothing about its output. The Official History does, however, appear to be the first occasion the station’s codename, MOONSHINE, was disclosed.

Only with the publication in 2015 of ffrench-Blake’s memoirs, and the subsequent release to the National Archives of various MoD and FCO files (possibly triggered by the appearance of the memoirs) could others make their own assessments of the story behind RAdS. [5]

The passage of more than 30 years following the war before authoritative documentation on RAdS’s activities became public allowed myths, misunderstandings and inaccuracies about the station to go unanswered. See the post Ten myths about Radio Atlantico del Sur. 

Notes

[1] BBC Monitoring reported in late April that 9690 kHz was being used to relay Radio Rivadavia, a privately-owned station in Buenos Aires, at 0000-1000 GMT, and to air state radio's external service RAE (Radiodifusion Argentina al Exterior) at other times of the day. By late May, BBC Monitoring reported that 9690 kHz was on the air more or less around the clock, with relays at various times of RAE and the domestic services Radio Nacional and Radio Noticias Argentinas.

[2] The proposed time of the morning transmission went through several changes during the planning stage. The MoD announced to the press on 19 May that the morning broadcast would be a 90-minute one at 0815 GMT. But when the morning programme was eventually launched on 28 May, its duration had been shortened to 60 minutes and the start time amended slightly to 0830 GMT.

[3] The full names of these officers, and of other members of the SPG, are given in declassified MoD files, but I have chosen not to name in this blog anyone intimately associated with RAdS unless their identity is already published or they have confirmed to me that they are happy to be named.

[4] The Falklands War: The Full Story (1982) by the Sunday Times and The Battle for the Falklands (1983) by Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins.

[5] The memoirs (which appeared under the title The Pol Pot Conspiracy) are largely concerned with ffrench-Blake’s clandestine activities on behalf of the CIA in Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 90s, for which he found his work on Radio Atlantico del Sur a useful preparation.

Disclaimer: I was employed by the BBC at the time of the 1982 war, and continue to be so. However, this is an entirely personal blog post, reflecting only my views.

© 2017-2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

The Foreign Office's last stand

Disclaimer: I was employed by the BBC at the time of the 1982 war, and continue to be so.
However, this is an entirely personal blog post, reflecting only my views. 

Acknowledgements: I’ve only been able to write this post because of the work of Argentine psychological warfare specialist Alejo Miguel Díaz, who uncovered the final version of the proposal to set up Radio Atlantico del Sur that was presented to the British War Cabinet in May 1982. Many thanks also to Lee Richards of PsyWar.Org for unearthing earlier, draft, versions of the proposal and accompanying memos from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign Office (FCO). Together, their work has allowed me to undertake a textual analysis of the differences between these documents.

A battle in Whitehall

In my post "The War Cabinet is invited to agree" I described the battles the MoD fought with the FCO in late April and early May 1982 to get agreement for Radio Atlantico del Sur to be launched.

The FCO was firmly opposed to the project from the start, and lobbied other government departments and the BBC in a bid to get it blocked.

As the arguments continued between the FCO and the MoD it became clear that the dispute would only be ended by taking the matter to the War Cabinet – known formally as the Overseas and Defence Committee, South Atlantic or OD(SA) – for a final decision.

The MoD therefore drafted a proposal to launch Radio Atlantico del Sur for the War Cabinet to consider.

This proposal went through several drafts, and some of these can be found in the declassified MoD and FCO files from the time. In my previous post I provided the text of what I believed to be the latest available version, which was attached to a covering letter dated 12 May from the MoD to the Cabinet Office.

The FCO's amendments

I noted that the following day (13 May) Keith MacInnes of the FCO's Information Department requested several amendments to be made to the draft before it was seen by the War Cabinet. These played on difficulties (real or imagined) with the project and were no doubt intended to persuade the War Cabinet to veto it.

I said it was not known whether any of MacInnes's amendments were incorporated in the final version of the paper presented to OD(SA).

Now we know the answer. A photocopy of a later version of the proposal, dated 13 May, is to be found in the 2016 thesis by Alejo Miguel Díaz on the South Atlantic conflict. The date of the document, and its layout, indicate that it is the final version of the proposal, as seen by members of the War Cabinet.

The final proposal to the War Cabinet

Below, I have transcribed the text of the 13 May document, providing explanations where it differs from the version of the previous day following the insertion of the FCO's amendments.

SECRET

RADIO ATLANTICO DEL SUR
Note by Ministry of Defence officials

1. This project envisages the use of a BBC transmitter on Ascension Island to broadcast to the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands and, to a lesser extent, on their mainland coastal bases. The aim will be military and designed to maximise the use of radio to demoralise Argentine troops (particularly conscripted troops) currently occupying the Falklands, reinforcing its [sic] sense of isolation, and so reducing the willingness of the Argentine garrison to resist any landing. Responsibility would rest with the Ministry of Defence. [The previous sentence was an addition – part of the FCO's effort to distance itself from the project and ensure that if it went wrong all the blame would fall on the MoD.]

2. Programmes would mainly consist of popular music likely to appeal to Argentine conscripts – many of whom have short-wave radios – interspersed with news items carefully selected from the world's media. No lies would be told. Presenters, experienced in radio and fluent in the Spanish spoken in Argentina, would adopt a relaxed and informal approach. Programmes would be put together in London. A note about possible approaches is at Annex A. [1]

3. The BBC cannot be expected to provide this sort of programme since their worldwide reputation depends on a less obviously targeted and selective approach. Their current broadcasts to Latin America are effective enough to have prompted Argentine jamming but are directed at a wider and rather higher level audience. [The previous two sentences are an expansion of a single original one which read: "The BBC are unwilling to provide this sort of programme within their current broadcasts to Latin America which are directed at a higher level audience." The aim of the FCO's revised wording was to stress the success of the BBC's existing broadcasts and to highlight the risk of damage to the BBC's international reputation.] If, therefore, programmes aimed at an audience of Argentine conscripts are to be broadcast, HMG will need to make the programmes and use the only suitable transmitter, which is one of the BBC's on Ascension Island. This would not cause the loss of any BBC programme, but it would limit the options open to the BBC in circumventing Argentine jamming of its current broadcasts and it would cause some loss in the quality of reception. To minimise the effects on the BBC's Latin American and West African services (both broadcast from Ascension Island), it would only broadcast between 0530 and 0730 and 2000 and 2300. [2] The evening broadcast is the more important because less of the audience is then likely to be involved in their military duties. But transmissions then would somewhat weaken reception for listeners of the BBC World Service in English broadcasts to South America and the Falklands. [The previous sentence was an addition by the FCO, intended to stress the damage to BBC listeners.] One suitable frequency, allocated to the UK but currently unused, is available. Since Argentina seems bound to try jamming [hardening the original wording: "If Argentine jamming needed to be countered"], further frequencies might need to be found from [originally: "might need to be 'poached' from"] other countries which could cause problems in future international broadcasting negotiations. [The passage "which could cause problems in future international broadcasting negotiations" was an addition – an FCO ploy to suggest future diplomatic difficulties.]

4. Costs, including staff costs, are estimated at £15K per week, assuming 5 hours broadcasting [per day].

5. The service would have to operate openly: to attempt to do otherwise would quickly be spotted (eg by electronic location of the transmitter).

6. One obvious concern is that we should not undermine the high reputation of the BBC world-wide. The [BBC] Director-General has said that they would understand if the Government decided to set up such a service. Their primary concern would be to be "sanitised" from it publicly (eg by their transmitter being requisitioned rather than volunteered, and there being no visible links to BBC External Services). This should be entirely feasible but the BBC might have to issue a public statement and the radio station itself could become news – a press line would be needed. [The previous sentence originally just said "This should be entirely feasible." The additional wording was the FCO's attempt to suggest a potential public relations problem for the BBC and/or the government. However, the FCO didn't entirely get its way on this passage, as it had wanted to have even stronger wording, including the sentence: "There could be criticism of the Government's apparent 'takeover' of a function the BBC does well."]

7. There would no doubt be allegations of "black propaganda" in some quarters but it would become apparent from the nature of the broadcasts that this was not true. A good deal of criticism would in any case be avoided by taking an open approach to the project in public from the outset.

8. The potential gains from a radio station of this kind – weakening Argentine resistance to a landing of the Falkland Islands and saving lives – are important. No other programmes being broadcast to Latin America have this aim. On balance, the criticism we might face is justified by the potential saving of lives (on both sides).

10.[sic] OD(SA) is invited to agree that Radio Atlantico del Sur should proceed as outlined above. Broadcasts can start within 2 days.

Ministry of Defence
13 May 1982

Outcome

The FCO's efforts came to naught. OD(SA) gave its approval on 18 May and Radio Atlantico del Sur began broadcasting the following day.

Notes

[1] Annex A is the document "Programming - Interim Assessment" written by RAdS's civilian manager, Neil ffrench-Blake, and discussed in my post Setting the Record Straight. The text of the "Interim Assessment" can be read on the PsyWar.Org website.

[2] The times given were Falkland local times – three hours behind GMT and four hours behind British Summer Time. The proposed time and duration for the morning broadcasts were subject to considerable discussion and revision during the planning phase, and when they eventually began on 28 May they were at 0530-0630 local time.

© 2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

Post Office Box 408 London

Acknowledgement: Thanks to Mike Barraclough for permission to quote from his 1982 correspondence with the MoD.

Address

Post Office Box 408 – or "Casilla de correos cuatro cero ocho, GPO, Londres, Inglaterra" as it was given out over the air – was the address to which Radio Atlantico del Sur invited its listeners to write.

I received this card  –  eventually. Note the address.

Motivation

Why did the station announce an address, given that its target audience – members of the Argentine forces on the islands – would be unlikely to be able to write in?

The answer is that everything aired by RAdS had one of two purposes:

1. Furthering its primary objectives of persuading Argentine troops to "hesitate before firing on British troops" and "consider positively the benefits of surrendering".

2. Establishing the station's credibility with the target audience so that the latter would be receptive to the messages in Point 1.

Announcing an address served the second purpose: winning and reinforcing credibility. It did this in three ways:

Authenticity: Even if they don't wish to do so, listeners expect a radio station to provide a means of contacting it.

Cover: The address helped to explain the bogus dedications that were read out to named members of the Argentine forces on the islands.

Transparency: A London address refuted any suggestion that the station was an unavowed black operation.

As a bonus, it might provide feedback. Which radio station doesn't want to hear from its listeners?

Win a candle-lit dinner with Mariana

Soliciting mail from listeners was neatly combined with the psychological tactics of RAdS's sole female presenter, Mariana Flores, whose work I have already discussed.

In an article on the station, the Times reported (5 June 1982):

There is currently a competition, offering a candle-lit dinner with Mariana to the sender of the letter that comes from furthest away from Ascension Island, though quite how the letters will reach her is not clear.

Mariana, the Times explained, was the station's "star" presenter, "the Tokyo Rose of the 1980s":

"I have not yet met the man of my dreams," she told the troops enticingly recently.

I write to the station

I heard Radio Atlantico del Sur give out its address on 20 May 1982 (its second day on the air). I wrote to it, describing what I had heard (a so-called reception report), explaining my interest as a shortwave radio enthusiast, wishing the staff success in their work and asking if they could send me their card. [1]

I addressed the letter to PO Box 408 - and back it came to me about 10 days later.

The address was correct  –  but it was returned to me

The envelope had been stamped INCOMPLETE ADDRESS with a penciled addition: "Not a Box No". I was amused to see that someone else had written "Try Bush House" (the HQ at the time of the BBC External Services). [2]

What had gone wrong? Perhaps the PO Box address was so new that not all sorting offices knew about it.

I heard that other radio enthusiasts had received replies from the Ministry of Defence's Main Building in Whitehall, and so the week after the end of the conflict I wrote again, using that address rather than the PO Box number. This time (and I still have a copy of my letter) I was able to congratulate the staff on a job well done and note that their work might have saved lives on both sides. 

About 10 days later I received the card shown at the top of this page. 

Who else wrote to them?

An MoD report written soon after the war said:

Listener response started slowly after about a week’s broadcasting, quickly rose to a steady stream and is still being received. More than 100 letters have been received from all over the world. Of most interest are those from Latin America which currently total 26. The vast majority speak in favourable terms of RAdS broadcasts which are generally described as informative and interesting. What emerged clearly is the dislike of most Latin Americans for Argentina and hence their approval of RAdS. Not surprisingly the five responses from Argentina are not favourable although they have confirmed the ineffectiveness of the attempts to jam and a keen awareness of RAdS in Argentina.

Three quarters of the letters, therefore, came from outside Latin America. It's likely that most of them were from shortwave radio enthusiasts (the jargon term is DXers) such as me. 

That's not to say that some of the enthusiasts were not also interested in the political and military aspects of the station's operations.

When my friend and fellow DXer Mike Barraclough sent in his reception report he added that he felt press criticism of the station was unfair and that psychological warfare was justified if it was effective. In reply, he received the following note:

Thank you for your letter and helpful comments. If you feel sufficiently strongly it would help our cause if you conveyed the same sentiments to the press. The Times and Observer have written articles which appear very prejudiced to us. You will appreciate that we cannot reply directly ourselves as MOD employees. Thank you again for writing.

The British press

The articles in the Times and Observer mentioned in that MoD reply to Mike were probably those published on 5 June and 30 May respectively. Both portrayed RAdS's broadcasts as amateurish.

The piece in the Times was particularly harsh. Headlined "The ultimate weapon – Radio station could be last straw for invaders", its opening sentence set the tone:

If the British artillery does not blast the Argentinians out of Port Stanley, or the RAF's leaflets cow them into surrender, it is just possible that the 8,000 Argentine troops in the islands will still give up just to get away from Radio Atlantico del Sur, the Ministry of Defence's propaganda service to the beleaguered troops.

The Times would not have known that the RAF leaflets to which it referred were prepared by the same MoD unit, the Special Projects Group (SPG), that ran Radio Atlantico del Sur.

The Observer's article – headlined "What Britain tells the enemy" – was more measured, reporting that RAdS's broadcasts were exploiting differences within the Argentine junta, in particular criticisms by the air force of the inaction of the Argentine army and navy.

But the Observer also spoke of RAdS's "crude and occasionally comic attempts at demoralisation".

A helpful civil servant?

My reply from Radio Atlantico del Sur came in a standard OHMS franked buff envelope stamped with a return address in the MoD's Main Building.

But fellow DXers John Campbell and Gordon Darling reported that their replies came in envelopes postmarked, respectively, Hemel Hempstead and Chesham & Amersham (all three are commuter towns to the north of London), suggesting that an interested member of the MoD's staff who lived in that area took it upon themselves to handle mail from hobbyists in a private capacity, rather than as part of office business.

Notes

[1] At the time, most shortwave radio stations solicited reception reports from listeners. The stations would generally reply with a "verification card", also known as a QSL card, confirming the listener's reception, and often other promotional items (pennants, stickers, leaflets).

[2] What is now known as the BBC World Service (operating in English and many other languages) was in 1982 still referred to as the BBC External Services – and in internal BBC bureaucracy as External Broadcasting (XB). At that time, the "World Service" name was reserved solely for the service in English. This distinction was abandoned in 1988 when the "External Services" name was dropped and all international broadcasting by the BBC came under the World Service brand.

© 2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

Did the MoD broadcast military secrets to Argentina?

The raid on Pebble Island

A prominent news story covered by Radio Atlantico del Sur during its first night on the air (19-20 May 1982) was the British raid a few days earlier on Pebble Island, off the north coast of West Falkland. The Argentines had stationed ground-attack aircraft at the island's air strip. Members of the British Army's Special Air Service (SAS) were landed by helicopter on Pebble Island in the early hours of 15 May and attacked the aircraft. A British warship offshore shelled the air base. 

The raid was a success. All the aircraft were damaged, an ammunition dump and fuel stores were hit and an Argentine officer who led a counter-attack was killed (he was the only fatality on either side; the aim of the raid had been to destroy the aircraft rather than kill enemy troops).

A summary of RAdS's story on the raid is in the declassified MoD files on the station:

The attack on Pebble Island was carried out by the SAS, using 12 teams of 4 men each; 11 aircraft were destroyed, as well as a munitions dump. The SAS is an elite force drawn from the British Army, specialising in clandestine military operations. Recruitment is by a rigorous selection process - only 1 in 50 volunteers being selected.

The Guardian gave an account of RAdS's reporting of the SAS. In a 22 May article headlined "MoD beams in terror tactics, pop and propaganda", it said:

The next item appeared to be designed to instil a fear of the SAS in the Argentine garrison. It was described as an elite corps within the British Army that was hand-picked and specialised in clandestine military operations, with the clear implication that SAS units were already on the islands.

"Potentially embarrassing" 

As any British journalist who reports defence and security affairs will have spotted, RAdS's coverage of the SAS had a problem: it contravened D Notice guidelines.

The D (Defence) Notice procedure – now known as the Defence and Security Media Advisory (DSMA) system – is widely misunderstood, but it certainly covers, to use the current wording, "the inadvertent disclosure of classified information about Special Forces... including their methods, techniques and activities". This would have included reporting the deployment of the SAS in the Falklands in such a specific manner.

This breach of guidelines did not go unnoticed. At the very next day's (20 May) morning meeting between the Permanent Undersecretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Frank Cooper, and his senior staff, alarm was expressed that the previous night's RAdS broadcast had referred to the SAS. 

The meeting triggered a small flurry of memos which are now in a declassified MoD file. Sir Frank's private secretary, S. Webb, wrote to B. Miller, head of the MoD's DS6 (Defence Secretariat 6), to ask:

Whether the station should make public information that we are not prepared to release to the press... the reference to the SAS on last night's broadcast was quoted [at the meeting] as an example, though it was not clear whether this was just a report of UK press stories.

Webb added that there was also concern about how to answer questions that might be asked in Parliament and:

The detailed arrangements within MoD for settling questions of editorial policy and giving directions to the [civilian] station manager.

Miller replied the same day:

We are attempting to obtain a translation of what was actually said but we understand that the reference was one of a number of items culled from "various sources" and was clearly identified as such. Nevertheless the reference to the SAS by an MoD organ is unfortunately and potentially embarrassing for us in our dealings with the Press. I have therefore written to SPC/CDS to make it clear that the Station must in future observe the guidelines that we urge upon the Press when dealing with Special Forces. [1]

(SPC/CDS was the colonel who led the Special Projects Group (SPG), the MoD unit which had set up Radio Atlantico del Sur.)

Guidelines tightened

It appears that the incident resulted in the tightening up of the written editorial guidelines issued to the Media Assessment Team (MAT), the cover name for the group of journalists, editors and presenters who produced RAdS's programmes.

On the question of sources, the "Initial Guidelines" issued to MAT staff merely said:

[RAdS's] sources of information will be British and foreign [news] agencies. Argentine sources will only be quoted if compatible with our aim. No lies are to be told.

(The full text of the "Initial Guidelines" can be read in my post "No Lies are to be told" – see Annex A to "MEDIA ASSESSMENT TEAM DIRECTIVE").

This was later amended to:

The presentation of news must not conflict with the MOD press line for the day. MAT is to maintain close contact with PR to achieve this. News is to be attributed clearly to some overt source, preferably a media source. Under no circumstances is RAdS to lay itself open to accusations that it has scored a “scoop” over the UK media. Thus, if the editorial staff is keen to use a particular news theme which has not been announced through PR, OC [officer commanding] MAT is to attempt to influence the MOD news release staff to take steps which will permit use on RAdS.

"Secret the MOD told Argentina"

There seems to have been at least one further breach of the guidelines.

Under the headline "British radio told foe of the QE2's arrival", the New York Times of 14 June 1982 reported:

The Argentine garrison on the Falkland Islands heard about the arrival of the reinforcements aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2 four days before it was announced here [London], over the British Ministry of Defense's own radio station.

The daily summary of the output from Radio Atlantico del Sur, broadcast from Ascension Island, said that on June 1 and 2, ''arrival of reinforcements from the QE2'' was disclosed. [2]

Yet it was not until 6 P.M. on June 6 that the ministry announced in London that the Fifth Infantry Brigade had disembarked for the Falklands. Until then, the ministry had removed any mention of the troops arrival from the dispatches of correspondents in the field.

According to Valerie Adams, in her book The Media and the Falklands Campaign, the same claim was also reported in the 14 June edition of London's Evening Standard. In an article headlined "Secret the MOD told Argentina", the paper said that RAdS broadcast news of the "arrival of reinforcements from the QE2" on the night of 1-2 June. 

Adams noted: 

This was when the landings [of 5th Infantry Brigade at San Carlos] were still taking place, and was despite MoD's request to the press to keep silent on the subject. According to Sir Frank Cooper, Radio Atlantico del Sur only broadcast information already carried in the British media. But even if this was simply a report of speculation, specifically drawing the latter to Argentina's attention seems to have been at variance with MoD's policy.

Notes

[1] The memos written on 20 May 1982 by MoD officials Webb and Miller can be found in the National Archives in MoD file DEFE 25/502.

[2] Radio Atlantico del Sur's studios were in London but its signal was beamed to the Falklands from a transmitter on Ascension Island.

Disclaimer: I was employed by the BBC at the time of the 1982 war, and continue to be so.
However, this is an entirely personal blog post, reflecting only my views.

© 2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

Ten myths about Radio Atlantico del Sur

Disclaimer: I was employed by the BBC at the time of the 1982 war, and continue to be so. However, this is an entirely personal blog post, reflecting only my views.

Myths and realities

1. Radio Atlantico del Sur was set up to broadcast British government propaganda on the Falklands dispute to Argentina (and Latin America as a whole), undermining the balanced and objective output from the BBC's Latin American service.

Reality: RAdS's sole target audience was members of the Argentine forces in the Falklands. It had no interest in broadcasting to Argentine civilians or anyone else in Latin America, or in competing with the BBC's Spanish-language output.

2. Radio Atlantico del Sur tried to persuade its listeners to accept the British case for sovereignty over the islands.

Reality: RAdS went out of its way to avoid discussing the sovereignty question, regarding it as potentially counter productive. Similarly, it sought to avoid being seen to undermine Argentine troops' loyalty to their flag.

3. Radio Atlantico del Sur was set up by Margaret Thatcher or her supporters as a measure to counteract the BBC, which they felt was not projecting Britain's views strongly enough.

Reality: It's unlikely that Thatcher was aware of the plan to set up RAdS until it was well advanced. One of Thatcher's closest supporters, her press secretary Bernard Ingham, was aware of the plan, strongly opposed it and tried to stop the project. The plan was also opposed by Lord Belstead, who had been appointed by Thatcher as a Foreign Office minister shortly after the invasion of the Falklands.

Effects on the BBC

4. By depriving the BBC of the use of a transmitter on Ascension Island, Radio Atlantico del Sur weakened the signals that carried the BBC's Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America.

Reality: No transmissions by the BBC Latin American service were affected in any way at any time. During RAdS's evening broadcasts, two transmitters on Ascension Island carried BBC services in Spanish and Portuguese (the same number of transmitters as before). The BBC Latin American service was not on the air at the time of RAdS's morning broadcasts. Some listeners in Latin America to one frequency (of many) carrying the BBC World Service in English might have noticed a reduction in signal strength for three hours a day because of RAdS's broadcasts.

5. Radio Atlantico del Sur poached a BBC frequency.

Reality: Neither of RAdS's frequencies (9700 and 9710 kHz) were used by the BBC at the time or had been used in the immediate preceding years. They were chosen (after discussions with BBC frequency managers) because they were close to an Argentine channel (9690 kHz).

6. The BBC wholeheartedly opposed the existence of Radio Atlantico del Sur.

Reality: The BBC's assistant director-general, Alan Protheroe, supported RAdS from early in its planning stage and discreetly arranged for its planners to receive BBC technical advice. Protheroe's boss, Director-General Ian Trethowan, took a more neutral line, but resisted pressure from RAdS's opponents in the Foreign Office to come out publicly against the project. While Protheroe and Trethowan kept a public silence, a campaign against the project was led by the managing director of BBC external broadcasting, Douglas Muggeridge, an ambitious man new to his post, who misunderstood RAdS's purpose. His protests were given coverage by anti-government newspapers in Britain. No other senior BBC official appears to have spoken publicly about the issue one way or another. Meanwhile, backroom BBC staff in London and Ascension helped to get RAdS on the air.

Necessary secrecy

7. Radio Atlantico del Sur was staffed by amateurish civil servants from the MoD.

Reality: The majority of RAdS's staff were members of the British armed forces, including some of Latin American heritage, or civilians hired from outside the MoD for their professional skills as broadcasters, engineers, journalists or linguists.

8. Radio Atlantico del Sur's staff kept silent after the war out of embarrassment over their "amateurish" activities.

Reality: RAdS's staff operated under conditions of strict secrecy during the war, and were told to maintain such secrecy afterwards. This was mainly to protect the identities of those members of staff who had Argentine family connections. More than 30 years later, once some of the secrecy concerns had eased, RAdS's civilian manager Neil ffrench-Blake published his memoirs in which he stoutly defended the station against its critics and made clear his pride in what it had achieved.

9. Argentine troops made fun of Radio Atlantico del Sur's broadcasts.

Reality: There is no authoritative published research on opinion about RAdS among its target audience. A range of views has been expressed by other Argentines who heard the broadcasts or who have studied its output since.

10. Radio Atlantico del Sur was a failure.

Reality: In the confusion of a war, it can be hard to attribute degrees of success or failure to individual actions or projects. But to quote Neil ffrench-Blake: "The Argentinians did surrender, didn't they?"

© 2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

Coming up...

This blog has just marked its first birthday.

After a break of several months in writing posts, I've spent time in fresh research, and that's resulted in recent weeks in posts about British psychological warrior Mariana Flores and General Galtieri's mystery decree.

I've also given the blog a birthday cleanup, tidying up formatting problems that had appeared in several posts. All posts should now look fine on Chrome browsers accessed via Windows, and on iPhone's Safari browser. Blogger's stats say these are the two most popular ways the blog is viewed. Let me know if you spot any remaining problems.

Now it's time to plan some future posts. Some I have in mind include:

Casilla de correos 408  That was the PO Box in London that Radio Atlantico del Sur invited its listeners to write to. I'll describe what happened when I wrote to that address in May 1982. 

Did Radio Atlantico del Sur give away military secrets to Argentina?  On at least two occasions, the station was said to have broadcast items that contravened the MoD's editorial guidelines.

The FCO's last stand  I've already outlined some of the attempts by the British Foreign Office (FCO) to prevent Radio Atlantico del Sur from taking to the air. A document found by an Argentine researcher sheds light on the FCO's final bid to get the British War Cabinet to stop the venture.

© 2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.