Sunday, 24 September 2017

The incident at Crowsley Park on the night of 20-21 May 1982

This is one of a series of posts on Radio Atlantico del Surthe Spanish-language shortwave station operated by the British Ministry of Defence in the final four weeks of the April-June 1982 Falklands War. 

This particular post is about a specific technical aspect of RAdS's operations. The question behind this aspect can be put simply:

Radio Atlantico del Sur's studio was in London and its transmitter was on Ascension Island. How then did the signal get from the former to the latter?

(Update in May 2022: This article was written in 2017. The question of the link from London to Ascension has since been fully answered, and is explained at the end of the article. The answer means that much of the discussion in the article is now redundant, but I have left it here as a curiosity!)

Reporting for duty

Late one spring evening in the early 1980s I was driving down a dark and deserted road in rural south Oxfordshire. Completely quiet, it would be easy to forget that I had left my home in a Reading suburb just minutes earlier. I turned left at a crossroads by some farm buildings. The road narrowed to the width of a single vehicle and sloped downwards quite sharply, a reminder that I was on the fringes of the Chiltern Hills. Thick woodland stretched out into the darkness on one side of the road. As it turned upwards again, open country appeared. 

I turned right into the grounds of a private country estate. Had I looked up as I passed between the stone gate posts at the entrance, I might have glimpsed by the light of my headlamps two statues of hell hounds with spears through their mouths – for this ancient estate is said to have been one of the inspirations for Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Hound of the Baskervilles.

Moving up the drive, I passed the turning to the estate’s 18th century mansion house. My destination was a smaller, single-storey modern building in the heart of the park. As I stepped out of my car, eight thousand miles away, at sea in the South Atlantic, British troops were being briefed that in just a few hours they would land on the shores of San Carlos Water.

Quite unaware of that, I walked into the building. 

It was 10.45 p.m. on Thursday 20 May 1982 and I was reporting for duty on the night shift at the BBC Receiving Station, Crowsley Park.

Caversham and Crowsley

BBC Monitoring began life in August 1939 at Wood Norton, near Evesham in Worcestershire. In 1943, the service moved to Caversham Park, on a hillside overlooking the Thames Valley on the outskirts of Reading.

If Caversham Park was its brains, its ears were three miles to the north at Crowsley Park. In a remote and very electrically quiet area, this was ideal for setting up an extensive array of aerials for picking up weak and distant radio stations. The signals received were fed down telephone lines to Caversham to be listened to by hundreds of monitors speaking between them dozens of languages.

In 1974, the BBC's separate receiving station at Tatsfield – on the North Downs near Biggin Hill – closed and its functions were merged with the operation at Crowsley. By 1982, Crowsley was engaged in various tasks including acting as BBC Monitoring's receiving site, being part of the transmission chain for the Voice of America, tracking the occupancy of the shortwave, mediumwave and longwave bands, measuring the exact frequencies of BBC and foreign transmitters, and undertaking ad hoc reception checks for the BBC and other international broadcasters.

The night shift

There would have been around half of dozen of us on duty that night. One was my shift supervisor, who had been my immediate boss since I joined the BBC nine months earlier. A kind and cheerful man, I remember him with affection. He had joined the BBC straight from school (perhaps aged 14 or 15) in 1944 as a so-called Youth-in-Training (YiT).

(All the YiTs were boys. During the war many girls also joined the BBC straight from school, but in BBC-speak they were known as "Technical Assistants (Female)".)

On reporting for duty, the supervisor assigned us to our tasks for the night. I still have my 1982 diary and it tells me that for that night I was assigned to "the scan". Every day we took a small portion of the shortwave spectrum and logged every station we could hear in it. The results were used in the BBC's planning of its shortwave transmission schedule. The scan would also identify anomalies – new stations, ones that we hadn't heard before on that particular frequency, or unexpected gaps.

Listening to Radio Atlantico del Sur

Along with my assigned work, I also had another job in mind for the first part of the shift.

Radio Atlantico del Sur had launched the previous night, and I had listened live to its inaugural broadcast. I was going to be too busy to do that tonight, so I set a tape recorder running on a spare receiver tuned to RAdS's frequency, coming from the requisitioned BBC transmitter on Ascension Island.

I'd be able to listen to the tape at home at my leisure. 

The requisitioned transmitter duly came on the air at five minutes to midnight UK time (2255 GMT), airing Radio Atlantico del Sur's jingle and identification at one-minute intervals. RAdS's programmes then began as scheduled at the top of the hour.

Secret orders

At some point during RAdS's three-hour broadcast, and while I was busy with "the scan", one of my colleagues – who had also been very helpful in training me, and who tonight was sitting in the same room but working on another task – told me that he had heard that our supervisor had been given "secret orders" for that night.

These were to check the shortwave "feeder" transmitter that was being used to relay RAdS's signal from the UK to Ascension.

Our supervisor felt honour-bound not to reveal to us the exact frequency of RAdS's feeder, though he did disclose that it would not be coming from the BBC's Daventry (Northamptonshire) or Rampisham (Dorset) stations – used by the BBC for its own feeds to Ascension – but from British Telecom's radio station at Rugby (Warwickshire).

Rugby Radio Station

The Rugby station did not air public broadcasts, but carried commercial, maritime and military radio traffic.

Built by the Post Office in the 1920s, by the time of the Falklands War it was operated by BT, still in state ownership ahead of privatisation in 1984.

Although best known for its VLF (very low frequency) transmitters and their huge aerials (once a landmark by junction 18 of the M1 motorway), Rugby also had extensive shortwave capabilities. [1]

The hunt for the secret frequency

Although our supervisor had not revealed the frequency of RAdS's feeder, what can be transmitted by one man can be found by another, particularly a Crowsley monitor!

And so my colleague set about trawling the relevant portion of the shortwave band to find it.

He did so in quite a short time. It was on 11420 kHz upper sideband (USB). 

But...

So, we thought the problem had been solved. Just as the BBC used single-sideband (SSB) shortwave feeder transmitters at Daventry (where there were two of them) and Rampisham (just one) to get their programmes to Ascension, so Radio Atlantico del Sur was using Rugby for the same purpose. 

In turn, we could safely assume that Rugby received the signal by a BT circuit from RAdS's London studios.

However, the observations we made are at odds with two published sources, which suggest the use of a satellite link.

A satellite link?

Although Radio Atlantico del Sur's civilian manager, Neil ffrench-Blake, was at home in a radio studio (he had been programme director of a British commercial station in the 1970s) he made very little mention of RAdS's technicalities in his memoirs. On the question of feeding his signal from London to Ascension Island, his somewhat wordy memoirs uncharacteristically touch on the matter only briefly: 

We set up offices in London, near the MoD, and borrowed a set of studio equipment from a friendly radio station. Our broadcasts, which were live, were relayed to the transmitter via satellite by a commercial organisation. That was the main cost, in fact.

So, a very clear statement from a man in a position to know, albeit a statement published 33 years after the event.

A source dating very much closer to the events they describe is the official "Report on Psy Ops in OP CORPORATE". This document, an overall retrospective by the MoD, was written shortly after the 1982 war. (Operation CORPORATE was the British codename for the entire South Atlantic Campaign.)

It was released by the Ministry of Defence to the British National Archives in June 2017. The text of the document and the annexes can be read at Lee Richards' psywar.org website. https://www.psywar.org/

It's a substantial document, though as with ffrench-Blake's memoirs, the question of the studio-to-transmitter link is covered only briefly:

[A] case was submitted on 28 April 1982 under the codeword MOONSHINE to set up RAdS. It was proposed that a BBC transmitter should be taken over in Ascension for the duration of the broadcasts (4 hours daily) and that the broadcasts would be prepared in London and transmitted live (via satellite and land line links to the transmitter).

So another statement that the link was provided by satellite.

Conclusions

So, was there a satellite link? I doubt it. It's possible that the feeder we heard from Rugby was just a belt-and-braces backup for one, but it's more likely that Rugby was the sole link to Ascension.

If a satellite feed had been used there was the question of how it would have been handled at Ascension. The whole set-up at the BBC relay station there was based on the principle of receiving feeds from the UK on shortwave. Receiving a feed via satellite would presumably have involved the Cable and Wireless station on the island (which was quite separate from the BBC facilities) and then feeding the signal from C&W to the BBC site.

Above all, why bother to use a satellite feed when other, perfectly adequate, arrangements were already in place? 

My guess is that ffrench-Blake and his team, with so many other things to arrange in the very short time they had to launch a radio station from scratch, simply asked BT to look after the arrangements for getting the signal to Ascension, and didn't get involved in any of the technical details. The possibility of a satellite link might have been mentioned at the start by one side or the other, but BT would have soon found that a simpler arrangement was available.

As for the MoD's "Report on Psy Ops in OP CORPORATE", the mention of a satellite link comes from when RAdS was still in the proposal stage, rather than subsequent confirmation of what was used.

As it happens, by 1982 international broadcasters were phasing out the practice of using shortwave feeds to their overseas relay stations. The Voice of America had already shifted many of its feeds to satellite by then and the BBC was in the process of doing so. The feeds to the BBC East Mediterranean Relay Station in Cyprus switched to satellite in October 1982. One source says Ascension began using satellite feeds in 1985 while another says the switch took place "in the early 1980s".

So, this interesting footnote to Radio Atlantico del Sur's operations would never have arisen had the Falklands War taken place just a few years later.

Update in May 2022: In a TV documentary aired in April 2022 to mark the 40th anniversary of the war, Radio Atlantico del Sur's chief engineer Jim Warrack said the shortwave link provided by BT from the UK to Ascension was "rubbish". In his words: “The first thing I did after we started was switch the feed to the transmitter using a phone line because it was a far better signal." (The phone line would have used the SAT-1 undersea cable from Portugal to Ascension, with a separate cable running from the UK to Portugal.) 

So, the question has been answered! RAdS initially used the radio link from Rugby to Ascension, but this was soon replaced by a phone link using undersea cables.

Further reading

More details of the BBC's Crowsley Park receiving station can be found on its Wikipedia page

Notes

[1] Rugby's VLF transmissions included those to Royal Navy submarines (only signals at very low frequencies can reach submarines when submerged). HF (high frequency – i.e. shortwave) services from Rugby ended in 2000. VLF services ended in 2007 and the tall masts were demolished that year. See here for further details of Rugby Radio Station.  

© 2017 and 2022. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

Saturday, 16 September 2017

Argentine Annie and Radio Atlantico del Sur — A Comparative Study

The post was originally written in September 2017. It was revised in November 2017 and in October 2018.

Acknowledgement: Many thanks to Mike Barraclough, whose archives were particularly valuable when researching this post.

Note: I prefer to use the name Liberty rather than Argentine Annie, and you'll only see one further mention of the latter in this post (and that's in a footnote). In the remainder of this post I refer to the name of the Argentine radio station as Liberty and to its sole presenter (Silvia Fernández Barrio) as "Liberty".

Liberty v. Radio Atlantico del Sur

If you read a randomly-found article on the internet about Radio Atlantico del Sur there's a good chance that it will at some point mention Liberty/"Liberty" and say that it/she was Argentina's "version" of RAdS.

As the two stations are so often mentioned in the same breath, it's worth comparing them.

It's ironic that for many years more facts were known about some aspects of Liberty, which operated under a military dictatorship, than about Radio Atlantico del Sur, from democratic Britain.

Things we once knew about Liberty, but not about RAdS, included:
  • the real name(s) of its presenter(s)
  • the precise location of its studio
  • exactly how its programmes got from the studio to its transmitting station
The questions about RAdS's studio location and studio-transmitter link have now been addressed in posts on this blog.

But one thing we still don't know for sure about Liberty is its precise transmitter site, a question that is explored below. 

Liberty – Profile of a psychological operation

Summary: An English-language shortwave radio station broadcasting from Argentina during the April-June 1982 Falklands War.

Target audience: There were at least three targets: members of the British Task Force, civilian opinion in Britain and wider English-speaking audiences (including in the USA).

This multiplicity (and therefore confusion) of audiences was a major weakness, not least when it came to the technical targeting of Liberty's signal. The official Argentine news agency Telam on 6 June 1982 quoted a "reliable source" as saying that Liberty could not be heard in the Buenos Aires area because the beaming of its signal "ensured it reached the northern hemisphere with maximum strength".

But by that date, the Task Force had been in the southern hemisphere for many weeks.

This beaming of its signal to the north had the effect in Europe and North America of making Liberty often easier to hear than Radio Atlantico del Sur, which was beamed southwest from Ascension Island. And for British listeners, Liberty's evening broadcasts were more conveniently timed than those of RAdS, which did not come on the air until midnight UK time.

As a result, the content of Liberty's broadcasts is better documented than those of RAdS in English-language websites

Comparison: Radio Atlantico del Sur had a single target audience: Argentine forces in the Falklands.

Objectives: Again, Liberty had too many: to undermine morale in the Task Force, to influence British public opinion and to promote Argentina's cause in the wider world. 

Comparison: Radio Atlantico del Sur had just two simple objectives: to persuade Argentine troops to "hesitate before firing on British troops" and to "consider positively the benefits of surrendering". (These objectives were discussed in an earlier post.)

Operator: Argentine army intelligence. (Source: Interview with Fernández Barrio published in the Argentine newspaper La Nacion in April 2002, in which she added that army intelligence was in conflict with naval intelligence over her work. One is reminded of Radio Atlantico del Sur's own problems with squabbling between rival parts of the British government over its very existence.)

Outline of broadcasting operations: All broadcasts consisted of monologues by a single female presenter, interspersed with music. Fernández Barrio's La Nacion interview said the daily programmes (nominally 45 minutes long) were pre-recorded "very early" each morning in the studios of Radio Ciudad de Buenos Aires (owned by the city authorities and also known as Radio Municipal; it was, and still is, based at 1551 Sarmiento Avenue in central Buenos Aires). 

The tape was then taken by a police motorcyclist to the transmitting station to be put on the air. Each day's pre-recorded programme was given four airings in the afternoon/evening, Argentine time.

Comparison: All of Radio Atlantico del Sur's broadcasts went out live.

On-air identification and location: The female presenter never announced a formal station identification. She also never gave her name on air, only describing herself as "Liberty". [1]

Similarly, no specific place of origin was given. "Liberty" often said that she was "speaking to you from the heart of our Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands", though this was probably not intended to be taken as literally as it has been by some radio historians. The latter have sometimes reported that "Liberty" claimed to be broadcasting from the Falklands themselves.

The confusion extends in some cases to confusing Liberty with LRA60 Radio Nacional Islas Malvinas, the name given by the invading forces to the island's radio service (the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Station) after they seized it on 2 April 1982. 

Means of transmission: The broadcasts were aired on shortwave. The most commonly heard frequency was 17740 kilohertz in the 16-metre shortwave band. This channel (high up the shortwave band) is much more suitable for the lengthy path from Argentina to Europe and North America than the much shorter distance to the Falklands. [2]

The transmissions came from an unconfirmed location, though it was without doubt in the Buenos Aires area. See the section below, "Where was the transmitter site?"

Staffing: Although under military direction, the all-civilian production team was managed by Enrique Alejandro Mancini (1931-2008), a prominent broadcaster and journalist.

After the war, the voice that had called itself "Liberty" was identified as being that of TV presenter Silvia Fernández Barrio (born 1952). 

A Google search will easily find photos of Fernández Barrio and her story continues to be told in the Argentine media  see for example this feature in April 2017. 

Still active in public life, as of October 2018 she had 122,000 followers on Twitter  @silviafbarrio. She is also subject to criticism by some other Twitter users for collaborating with the military dictatorship.

Both Fernández Barrio and Mancini were happy later to acknowledge their work on Liberty.

Hours of transmission: Each pre-recorded programme was given four airings: at 1800, 2000, 2200 and midnight GMT (1500, 1700, 1900 and 2100 Argentine local time; 1900, 2100, 2300 and 0100 British local time). The duration of the programmes varied between 35 and 50 minutes.

First broadcast: In contrast to Radio Atlantico del Sur, no announcement was made by Liberty's operators either before or after its launch. The first known documented reception was on 21 April, by British radio enthusiast John Hurn, but the station could have been on the air for a day or perhaps even two before then. [3] 

Liberty's daily broadcasts were covered by BBC Monitoring from 22 April. The first mention of Liberty in the Argentine media also came on 22 April, when the official news agency Telam carried a Madrid-datelined dispatch, reporting that the broadcasts were being heard in Spain. My guess is that this Telam report was a "plant" by Liberty's operators to publicise news of its existence.

Last broadcast: Liberty stayed on the air for more than a week after the Argentine surrender (14 June), though the broadcasts on 19 and 20 June were repeats of the 18 June programme.

A farewell programme went out on 21 June, with repeat airings on the following three days. A farewell programme in Spanish also went out on those days; they were the only occasions on which Liberty was heard to broadcast in Spanish.

Total number of broadcasts: Assuming that the first transmission was on 21 April, and allowing for the repeats in June, a total of 60 unique English broadcasts were made, and aired over the course of 65 days. 

ComparisonRadio Atlantico del Sur made 47 broadcasts, over the course of 28 days.

British counter-measures: 
Beyond mocking comments by officials in response to questions from the press, there were no specific British counter-measures. Contrary to some Argentine claims, Britain did not attempt to jam the station. 

There is no documentary evidence for the suggestion that Liberty's appearance was the trigger for the UK government to set up Radio Atlantico del Sur

Where was the transmitter site?

There are two obvious candidates:

The first is the Buenos Aires facilities of Transradio Internacional. This enterprise, established in the 1920s, was what we would now call a transmission services company. Its work was mainly carrying commercial radio traffic. 

In the above-mentioned 2002 interview with Fernández Barrio, she specifically named Transradio Internacional as the transmitting station used by Liberty.

However, an excellent Spanish-language article by Horacio A. Nigro Geolkiewsky, while noting the suggestion that Transradio Internacional aired the broadcasts, also cites a claim by Argentine radio historian Daniel Camporini that by 1982 this site had closed and was "a ruined field". 

So, two good sources giving contradictory versions!

The second candidate is the state broadcaster's main shortwave transmitting station in the Buenos Aires suburb of General Pacheco. 

The problem here is that is not clear that there were any free transmitters available at this site during the 1982 war. Another excellent reference source, the Transmitter Documentation Project, says there were only a maximum of three shortwave transmitters at the General Pacheco station. The same figure of three transmitters is given by the 1983 edition of the World Radio TV Handbook.

BBC Monitoring's records show that during much of the 1982 war all three transmitters were in use more or less around the clock carrying state radio's external service RAE and relays of various domestic stations. [4]

Is there a third possibility? An article by Don Jensen in the November 1983 edition of Popular Communications magazine reported that "Argentine broadcasting insiders" had confirmed that Liberty "broadcast from a secret transmitter at a military base in the northern part of that country".

I'm unconvinced. It seemed to listeners in Europe and North America that Liberty was aired by a reasonably powerful (50 or 100 kilowatts) transmitter operating in AM mode. Military communications facilities tend to have transmitters of lower power, and don't normally use the AM mode.

So, in the absence of other definitive evidence, the exact transmitting site used by Liberty must be considered unconfirmed.

Strengths and weaknesses

One of Liberty's strengths was that it came on the air relatively quickly – less than three weeks after the invasion. Meanwhile, Radio Atlantico del Sur wouldn't launch for a further four weeks. This was a major regret for RAdS's manager, Neil ffrench-Blake, who said in his memoirs that "we didn't have sufficient time to build up our credibility".

A serious weakness of Liberty was the technical quality of its transmissions. This was not their signal strength, which was often good. It was the quality of the audio.

Part of the problem was that "Liberty" consistently used a decidedly soft tone at the microphone, with her voice described as sultry, smooth and sexy. But such a technique is ill-suited to shortwave.

In contrast, Radio Atlantico del Sur's presenters spoke boldly and distinctly.

"Liberty" was also let down by her engineers. Whether it was a faulty microphone, tape recorder or transmitter, the signal put on the air sounded muffled and woolly. For those who remember the days of magnetic tape, it may have been something as simple as dirty or misaligned playback heads in the tape player at the transmitting station. 

Whatever the cause, on many occasions, although the signal was strong, and one got a clear sense of the tone of "Liberty's" messages, their precise content was impossible to make out. 

In the stock phrase of shortwave-era BBC Monitoring, there were an awful lot of "words indistinct".

Finally, as discussed above, there was the problem of Liberty's multiple target audiences. Attempting to target the British Task Force was far too ambitious as an objective, both in practical and psychological terms. Members of the British armed forces would have been immune to such Argentine influencing efforts. 

Notes

[1] "Liberty" also used a number of oft-repeated phrases about herself, notably (with minor variations): "I am a voice, a spirit, a country. I am now, as ever, a woman who is proud that the world listens when Argentina speaks."

[2] Throughout its life, Liberty used 17740 kHz in the 16-metre shortwave band (the frequency had drifted down slightly to 17738 by mid-June). Initially, perhaps for just a few days from 21 June, it was also using 25680 kHz (in the 11-metre band).

There appear to have been no confirmed reports of reception on 15110 kHz (in the 19-metre band), mentioned in BBC Monitoring's archives as a possible replacement for 25680 kHz.

[3] A number of press reports at the time (notably in newspapers published on 24 April 1982) cited Hurn as saying that he first heard the station on Thursday 22 April. However, a report in the 22 April edition of Hurn's local paper, the Nottingham Evening Post, quoted him as saying that he heard it the previous night, and it is certainly my own recollection that Hurn beat us at BBC Monitoring to this scoop.

The press reports of the time attribute Hurn with having named "Liberty" as Argentine Annie.

"Liberty" even sent greetings to Hurn ("dear John") in one of her early programmes. (Source: Mike Burden in the World DX Club's magazine Contact.) Hurn's story appeared in many newspapers around the world, so it's no surprise that "Liberty" had heard of him.

[4] Interestingly, this round-the-clock broadcasting started at more or less the same time as Liberty appeared. The Telam news agency reported on 23 April (i.e. perhaps only two days after Liberty started) that three shortwave frequencies would be used to relay Radio del Plata (on 11710 kHz), Radio Rivadavia (9690 kHz) and Radio Continental (6060 kHz) at certain times of the day, with RAE (Radiodifusion Argentina al Exterior) aired on all three channels during the rest of the day.

Disclaimer: I was employed by the BBC at the time of the 1982 war, and continue to be so. However, this is an entirely personal blog post, reflecting only my views.

© 2017-2018. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.

Saturday, 2 September 2017

"The wrong sort of Spanish?"

This post was amended on 22 October 2017 to update the information in footnote 1 about the date of Bernard Ingham's letter, following the release of the letter by the National Archives.

Updated on 19 November 2017 to note that the location of Radio Atlantico del Sur's studios has now been publicly identified.

Update on 13 July 2019: A blog post dedicated to Bernard Ingham's letter has been published. 

About this blog post: This is the third of several posts on Radio Atlantico del Sur, the Spanish-language shortwave station operated by the British Ministry of Defence in the final four weeks of the April-June 1982 Falklands War.

The case against Radio Atlantico del Sur (Project MOONSHINE)

Even before it went on the air, Radio Atlantico del Sur had powerful enemies (in Britain that is, never mind Argentina). Those who opposed the setting up of RAdS used a number of arguments  some of them based on ignorance of its limited and purely military objectives. (See my separate post for a discussion of these objectives.)

Strong opposition came from a surprising quarter: Bernard Ingham, Mrs Thatcher's combative press secretary. Ingham  a familiar face on TV to anyone who lived in the UK in the 1980s  sometimes appeared more Thatcherite than his boss, but on the issue of Radio Atlantico del Sur he found himself taking a contrary position to hers. 

Ingham cultivated the persona of a blunt-speaking Yorkshireman whose job was to knock common sense into the fanciful heads of London journalists. This public image also extended to Ingham's behind-the-scenes work. 

The Official History of the Falklands Campaign (Volume 2) quotes him as describing the proposed station as an exercise in "downmarket dirty propaganda tricks". 

"We would be a lot better off if MoD put as much effort into ensuring a prompt PR response to South Atlantic events as it apparently puts into dreaming up moonshine," Ingham added, alluding to the project's codename. [1]

Similarly, Radio Atlantico del Sur's civilian manager Neil ffrench-Blake recalled a "handwritten scrawl" by Ingham on an official letter: "Let us have no more of this MOONSHINE." (This, and other quotes from ffrench-Blake in this post, are from his memoirsThe Pol Pot Conspiracy, published in 2015.)

In short, Ingham seemed to think that RAdS would be targeting a broad group of Spanish-speaking listeners in Argentina, perhaps in Latin America as a whole. In fact, its sole intended audience was Argentine troops in the Falklands.

The BBC's position

The BBC  to be more accurate, some of its senior figures  put forward several public objections in principle to the very existence of RAdS.

But opinion at the top of the corporation was divided. The Official History says that "the BBC was prepared to offer help and advice so long as it could publicly distance itself [from the broadcasts]".

And ffrench-Blake noted that while the head of the BBC External Services, Douglas Muggeridge, "made a lot of rude noises" in public about RAdS, "behind the scenes the Beeb could not have been more cooperative".

ffrench-Blake also said that "fortunately" Alan Protheroe, the BBC's assistant director-general (i.e. a more senior figure than Muggeridge), was an officer in the Territorial Army.

The British press certainly heard a strong line of opposition from the BBC, though Muggeridge's initial public statements were not so much "rude noises" as disdainful. 

"I believe... that people will realise that an operation of this kind is a very different matter to the type of international broadcasting done by the BBC," The Guardian (22 May 1982) quoted him as saying at the time of RAdS's launch.

RAdS's staff would have agreed with Muggeridge on that. They were indeed engaged in a "very different" business to that of the BBC.

Once the broadcasts became established, the BBC widened its criticisms from those about policy and principle to attacks on the style of Radio Atlantico del Sur's output.

"Extremely chatty, commercial radio style, bordering on vulgar" and "surpassing sometimes the limits of good taste" are BBC assessments of the time quoted in the Official History.

Such descriptions were intended to be wounding, though to me they make the broadcasts sound exactly the type of thing that would appeal to young Argentine conscripts.

ffrench-Blake put it well: "RAdS was not aimed at middle-aged civil servants. So it was no wonder that they did not understand it." I would only add that it was also not aimed at middle-aged BBC mandarins.

The "wrong sort of Spanish"

Some of the points made by RAdS's critics can be put down to Whitehall turf wars (ffrench-Blake said the "vehement opposition" to the project came "mainly from the Foreign Office"), hurt feelings among rival bureaucrats (he also said the MOD press office was unhappy), noses out of joint at the BBC, genuine misunderstandings of the station's purpose or knee-jerk reactions to a supposed "propaganda" operation.

But two very specific attacks on the station are sufficiently serious to deserve investigation.

The first is that the presenters on Radio Atlantico del Sur did not speak with Argentinean accents or idioms. 

This is a regularly repeated criticism of RAdS, and one acknowledged by ffrench-Blake. In his memoirs, he addressed the various claims that, as he put it, Radio Atlantico del Sur's presenters "spoke the wrong sort of Spanish".

Let's look at those claims, and his response.

Chilean, Colombian or Central American?

In his 1984 book Clandestine Confidential, author Gerry Dexter put the accusation bluntly: "Spanish language experts noted that none of the announcers had Argentine accents but were closer to what was called 'Cambridge-Chilean'."

Dexter also noted reports that the station aired "out-of-date Argentine pop music... of a type which might have more appeal to the parents of Argentine troops than the troops themselves".

His overall judgment of RAdS was that it was "a rather inept effort".

Some of Dexter's other statements on the station are demonstrably inaccurate, including small details about times and dates.   

More seriously, Dexter said that RAdS was "run by the RAF". This is incorrect, though at least two RAF technicians were seconded to assist on the engineering side of the project and other RAF personnel may have been recruited to help in other aspects. [2]

Andy Sennitt, a writer and broadcaster on international radio matters, has been consistently hostile to RAdS. Writing many years after the Falklands War, he described it as "a clumsy attempt at psychological operations (‘psyops’) presented by two civil servants, which amused the Argentinians and embarrassed the BBC".

In fact, there were up to nine presenters, all but one of whom were members of the British armed forces. (See my post MOONSHINE – A story of psychological warfare.)

In the same article, Sennitt asserted that the station originated "from a studio in the basement of the Foreign Office". This seems highly unlikely, not least because of the FCO's known hostility to RAdS

ffrench-Blake's memoirs don't reveal the exact location of the studio, beyond confirming that it was in central London.

Updated on 19 November 2017: Recently released MoD and FCO files confirm that RAdS broadcast from the studios of the Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC) in Kings Buildings, Smith Square, Westminister. See my post The Secret is Revealed: Radio Atlantico del Sur's studio.

On a separate occasion, writing in 2001, Sennitt had a different version of Dexter's claim about "Cambridge-Chilean" accents.

Sennitt repeated the claim that there were just two presenters and said: "The two speakers, a male and female, were FO employees who had learned Spanish from a Colombian and thus spoke with pronounced Colombian accents."

Sennitt was wrong on two other points in that 2001 piece, including a statement that RAdS was "created by the Foreign Office". As noted above, the FCO opposed the setting up of the station. [3]

Sennitt also claimed that the "amateurish operation by civil servants... broadcast on [a] well-known BBC frequency".

Again, this is untrue. Neither of RAdS's frequencies (9700 and 9710 kHz) are listed as used by the BBC in the 1980, 1981, 1982 or 1983 editions of the annual World Radio TV Handbook (whose Assistant Editor at the time was none other than Sennitt himself). 

And The Guardian report of 22 May 1982, already cited above, said: "It is very fortunate, in their [the BBC's] view, that it [RAdS] is on a frequency that has never been used by the BBC."

A further variant of the story about the accents on RAdS surfaced in August 2017. This time, according to an article in the Madrid newspaper El Pais, the supposed accents were neither Chilean nor Colombian but Central American!

ffrench-Blake's response

"Not only did our broadcasters speak fluent Argentinean argot, but we even had a South American Spanish expert sitting in the whole time to check and check again," he wrote in his memoirs.

He added that a number of members of RAdS's staff had family members living in Argentina. 

And he recounted how members of his staff "who spoke perfectly fluent Argentinian Spanish" would successfully call telephone numbers inside Argentina to gather information from local residents.

Future posts

We'll need to get to the bottom of the "wrong sort of Spanish" question at some point, but I'll leave that for another time.

I'll be tackling in a separate post the other serious criticism of Radio Atlantico del Sur: that it deprived the BBC of a valuable transmitter for its own broadcasts to Latin America.

Other topics I'll look at in future posts include:
  • Some of the technicalities of its operations, from its "secret" studio in London to its requisitioned transmitter on Ascension Island
  • My memories of listening to the station...
  • ... and what happened when I wrote to them
  • BBC Monitoring and Radio Atlantico del Sur
  • ffrench-Blake's thoughts on what might have been done better
  • And that key question: was it the "wrong sort of Spanish"?

And I guess that, in the interest of completeness, I should also write a post on "Liberty" (a.k.a. "Argentine Annie"), sometimes described – though not by me – as the Argentine equivalent of Radio Atlantico del Sur

Notes

[1] The Official History says these words were written on 10 April 1982, "when Ingham suspected the project to be dead". That would have been a very early date indeed for him to have thought that. By then the MoD's Special Projects Group (SPG) had only just begun work, and wouldn't formally submit a case to set up Radio Atlantico del Sur, under the codeword MOONSHINE, until more than a fortnight later (28 April). 

I wonder if Ingham's memo was written on 10 May (rather than 10 April), by which date the proposal had still not been put to the War Cabinet and so he could have reasonably assumed that it wasn't going ahead.

Update on 22 October 2017: I've now seen a copy of Ingham's letter, in MoD file DEFE 25/502 released by the National Archives in September 2017, and it is indeed dated 10 May 1982. 

The letter can be seen in the post "Who is this smug fellow Ingham?"

[2] Dexter said the unit in question was the RAF's "Operations, Electronic Warfare and Radio Division". Perhaps a military buff could tell us whether such a unit ever existed?

[3] If further evidence of Foreign Office hostility were needed, ffrench-Blake said the FCO withheld cooperation from him, including refusing to provide him with copies of Argentine newspapers. Instead, he had to use a private courier service from South America.

Disclaimer: I was employed by the BBC at the time of the 1982 war, and continue to be so. However, this is an entirely personal blog post, reflecting only my views.

© 2017. Material may be reproduced if attributed to Chris Greenway and any original source.